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NOWHERE TO HIDE: ENDING ANONYMITY 
IN THE FIGHT AGAINST HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING    
Rachel Berman-Vaporis* 
The current legal framework for combating human trafficking for 
sexual exploitation is reviewed noting its strengths and weaknesses. Next, 
the Palermo Protocol is evaluated to determine which legal weaknesses are 
now adequately addressed and which continue to be a problem. A strategy 
is then suggested to overcome the remaining loopholes in the legal fight to 
end human trafficking for sexual exploitation. This strategy involves the 
development of a database of those who have been convicted of human 
trafficking for sexual exploitation and related crimes in an effort to unify 
the definition of human trafficking, serve as a tool for prosecuting human 
trafficking, and increase the amount of case law available on human 
trafficking crimes. The obstacles for combating human trafficking for 
sexual exploitation are compared to those for combating sex crimes in 
domestic legislation. The positive effect of having a database similar to a 
sex offender registry is discussed and the potential negative consequences 
that could result from such a database are considered. Conclusions are 
drawn recommending the development of such database, as it will make the 
implementation of the Palermo Protocol and the prosecution of human 
traffickers, transparent to the international community. It will also act as a 
deterrent to those who participate in human trafficking for sexual 
exploitation. 
INTRODUCTION 
A nineteen-year old girl thought her stars had aligned when a woman 
approached her at the bus station. This woman offered her an opportunity 
to join her husband and get a job in the United States. She promised to help 
her. After days of cooking and cleaning for the woman to “earn her 
transportation to the United States,” her benefactress turned her over to 
three men who beat her, drugged her, and sold her for sex.1 For three 
months, she was locked in a small room as both men and women paid to 
rape and torture her. Her nightmare continued until American immigration 
officials discovered her in the trunk of her captor’s car at the U.S.-Mexico 
border. But she had to spend six months in a detention center and endure 
 
1. Diary of a Trafficking Victim, THE VICTIM’S INFORMER, 1, 10 (June/July 2011), 
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/documents/Victims_Informer_Vol_16_02.pdf 
(anonymous trafficking victim describing her experiences in sexual slavery).   
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consultations with multiple attorneys before she was “officially” identified 
as a trafficking victim.2  
This is testimony from a trafficking victim who survived. But what 
happened to the men and women who tortured and raped her in Mexico? 
Or her captors who continually drugged and beat her? What happened to 
the woman who fraudulently promised to help her obtain employment but 
instead sold her into sexual slavery?  
Human trafficking for sexual exploitation is on the rise all over the 
globe.3 All too often, victims are ignored by authorities or fall through the 
cracks of a society whose priorities are elsewhere. Perhaps even more 
appalling is the fact that the people responsible for these heinous crimes 
often suffer little or no penalty. Instead, lower-level criminals present when 
police raid a trafficking ring receive a slap on the wrist, and all other 
individuals involved in the criminal enterprise suffer little if any penalty. 
All they lose are a few slaves that are easy to replace or re-apprehend.  
The human trafficking problem has not gone unnoticed. The United 
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (“UNTOC”) 
and one of the accompanying protocols, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (“the 
Supplementary Protocol”),4 have tried to foster international cooperation to 
end this cycle.5 There has been little success to date due to the vague 
language found in both treaties and the lack of a specific tool to come out 
of these agreements to unify both the definition and prosecution of 
trafficking. Without such as tool, enforcement of human trafficking has 
been patchwork at best as national governments fruitlessly try to stem the 
flow of a crime that, because of its international character, requires 
international action. 
This Note will focus on human trafficking for sexual exploitation 
(“HTSE”). The current legal and enforcement framework to combat HTSE 
is deficient in a number of ways. These deficiencies allow HTSE to 
flourish because countries are secretly able to renege on their treaty 
 
2. Id. (anonymous trafficking victim describing her experiences in sexual slavery).   
3. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 45 (2012), 
http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2012/index.htm (finding that “the ILO 
identified a higher percentage of sex trafficking victims than in the 2005 
Report”); see also LOUISE SHELLEY, HUMAN TRAFFICKING: A GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE (2010) (discussing various forms of human trafficking and 
comparing human trafficking in various countries). 
4. Both of these documents will be referred to individually as well as jointly in this 
Note. When the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime is 
referred to individually, it will be referred to as UNTOC. When the Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children is referred to individually, it will be referred to as ”the Supplementary 
Protocol.” When they are both referred to at the same time, the two documents 
together will be referred to as “the Palermo Protocol.” 
5. See generally United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209.  
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obligations. To unify the definition of HTSE, aid in the enforcement of 
treaty obligations, and diminish the prevalence of HTSE by exposing all of 
those who support this crime, countries must adopt the Offenders of 
Humanity Database. The new tool proposed by this Note will allow 
individuals, NGOs, and governments to track the implementation of HTSE 
treaty obligations.  
This Note does not in any way include those involved in legal 
prostitution. While there are arguments as to whether prostitution is 
inherently exploitive, this Note focuses on the parts of the sex industry that 
are illegal.  
Part I of this Note will define and discuss the current status of HTSE. 
Part II will discuss the current international legal framework concerning 
HTSE and its deficiencies. Part III will provide a specific solution to 
address these deficiencies in the form of the Offenders of Humanity 
Database. 
I. HUMAN TRAFFICKING FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 
A. The Current Status of Human Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation 
Simply, human trafficking is slavery.6 Some of the earliest information 
on slavery comes from the Code of Hammurabi in the eighteenth century 
B.C. and from sources from the seventh century B.C. on the role of slaves 
in Greek society.7 Human trafficking is the modern manifestation of 
slavery.8 HTSE first rose to prominence as an international issue in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.9 At that time, the problem was 
commonly known as “white slavery” and focused “primarily . . . on 
trafficking in women for ‘immoral purposes’ or prostitution.”10 Early 
treaties on this subject “emphasized the coordination of information among 
state parties and discussed steps to repatriate the victims.”11 
 
6. Quick Facts About Human Trafficking, END HUMAN TRAFFICKING NOW (last 
visited November 8, 2013), http://www.endhumantraffickingnow.com/quick-
facts-about-human-trafficking/ (stating that human trafficking is “a contemporary 
form of slavery”). 
7. Bamber Gascoigne, History of Slavery, SLAVERY WORLD, 
http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/plaintexthistories.asp?historyid=ac41 (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2013) (tracing the history of slavery from its earliest known 
historical sources).  
8. Enrique A. Maciel-Matos, Comment, Beyond the Shackles and Chains of the 
Middle Passage: Human Trafficking Unveiled, 12 SCHOLAR 327, 328 (2010) 
(discussing how human trafficking constitutes “the largest manifestation of 
slavery” today). 
9. Elizabeth M. Bruch, Models Wanted: The Search for an Effective Response to 
Human Trafficking, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2004) (stating that “[h]uman 
trafficking has risen to prominence . . . in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.”). 
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 8. 
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This issue reemerged into international concern during “the growing 
global movement for women’s rights” in the 1970s.12 Currently, it is 
estimated that about 20.9 million persons are trafficked a year, and of 
these, over 4.5 million are trafficked for sexual exploitation.13 Despite the 
estimated 20.9 million trafficking victims, only 41,210 were identified as 
such in 2011.14 Trafficking can occur domestically, within a State, or across 
international borders.15 While the human trafficking operation takes many 
forms,16 often traffickers use force or lure their victims with false promises 
in order to obtain control over their victims and shuttle them across 
borders.17 Although men and boys are trafficking victims, the majority of 
victims are women and girls.18 In fact, 98% of individuals trafficked for 
sexual exploitation are female.19 While the business model for human 
trafficking can range anywhere from the small-scale entrepreneur model to 
global organized crime networks, the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime 
(“UNODC”) estimates that yearly profits from all aspects of human 
trafficking reach upwards of $31.6 billion.20 Profits for individual human 
traffickers vary, with sophisticated cartels “fetching $400,000 a head for 
 
12. Id. at 10. 
13. ILO 2012 Global Estimate of Forced Labour Executive Summary, 
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION 1, 1 (2012) 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@declaration/documents/p
ublication/wcms_181953. pdf. 
14. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 2, at 44. 
15. Id. at 45.  
16. INTERPOL, Types of Human Trafficking, http://www.interpol.int/Crime-
areas/Trafficking-in-human-beings/Types-of-human-trafficking (last visited Oct. 
26, 2013) (briefly detailing sexual exploitation, forced labour, commercial sexual 
exploitation of children in tourism, and trafficking for organs as the most 
prevalent forms of human trafficking). 
17. Deven Brewer, Globalization and Human Trafficking, HUMAN RIGHTS & HUMAN 
WELFARE 46, 47 (2009), 
http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/researchdigest/trafficking/Globalization.pdf 
(quoting the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime 
definition of human trafficking,  which states: “trafficking in persons means the 
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of persons either by 
threat or use of abduction, force, fraud, deception or coercion”). 
18. UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO FIGHT HUMAN TRAFFICKING, Human 
Trafficking: The Facts, 1, 
1http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/labour/Forced_labour/HUMA
N_TRAFFICKING_-_THE_FACTS_-_final.pdf (finding that 98% of the human 
trafficking victims that are sexually exploited “are women and girls”).  
19. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 2, at 45 (finding that “98 percent of sex 
trafficking victims” are female). 
20. UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO FIGHT HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 
16, at 2. 
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sex or forced labor.”21 Estimates of human trafficking are imprecise 
because of the “disparities in governmental and non-governmental 
definitions and the underground nature of human trafficking.”22 However, 
the monopolistic competition model can likely best explain a human 
trafficking business enterprise.23 This form of imperfect competition 
includes many producers that sell products that are slightly differentiated 
from each other but are not perfect substitutes.24 “There are many sellers in 
the [human trafficking market]” made up of “organized groups of criminals 
or small, loose networks of entrepreneurs.”25 And they are all selling the 
same product: human beings. 
Currently, the benefits to be gained from human trafficking far 
outweigh the costs, which assures “a willing cadre of traffickers.”26 While 
the profits are in the billions, due to the hidden nature of human trafficking, 
the exact effects of this business and the economic consequences if it is 
eliminated are not known.27 
While HTSE has gained increasing media attention in the last few 
years, its prevalence is not a new problem. Since the passing of UNTOC 
and the Supplementary Protocol, (together the “Palermo Protocol”) in 
2000, many countries are beginning to proactively combat human 
trafficking.28 These countries have set up their own frameworks to combat 
HTSE and human trafficking for labor purposes. However, of the limited 
resources available, more resources are devoted to labor trafficking instead 
of sex trafficking.29 This lack of focus on HTSE can compound the 
problems associated with combating HTSE.30  
 
21. Minnesota: A Human Trafficking Battleground, KARE11 (Feb. 16, 2012, 12:14 
AM), http://www.kare11.com/rss/article/959535/14/Minnesota-A-human-
trafficking-battleground. 
22. Elizabeth Wheaton, et al., Economics of Human Trafficking 48 INT’L MIGRATION 
114, 118 (2010). 
23. Id. at 118-19. 
24. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA, Monopolistic Competition Definition, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/390037/monopolistic-competition 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2013) (defining the model as a “market situation in which 
there may be many independent buyers and many independent sellers 
but competition is imperfect because of product differentiation, geographical 
fragmentation of the market, or some similar condition”). 
25. WHEATON, supra note 20, at 118-19. 
26. Id. at 119.  
27. Id. at 118 (noting that “[a]ll agencies and researchers cite the need for more 
information in order to understand and reduce trafficking in humans.”).  
28. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 2, at 44 (finding a global increase in reported 
prosecutions of traffickers, convictions, and victims identified since the passing 
of The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) of 2003). 
29. DUREN BANKS & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
CHARACTERISTICS OF SUSPECTED HUMAN TRAFFICKING INCIDENTS 2008-2010 
(2011) (noting that between January 2008 and June 2010, most suspected 
trafficking incidents were sex trafficking (82%), but “[f]ederal agencies were 
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Ironically, despite being a profitable enterprise for the traffickers, the 
modern human trafficking trade is rooted in the poverty of the victims.31 
Traffickers feed off the economic desperation of their victims and prey on 
their vulnerabilities in order to coerce, trick, or forcibly recruit them.32 
Traffickers lure their victims by exploiting “the dreams and fears of the 
poor” and by such means as “fraudulently advertising employment 
opportunities.”33 The key to the traffickers’ success is the targeting of the 
individuals who are “the most vulnerable and marginalized in society—
people who are already struggling to survive.”34 This most marginalized 
segment of society consists of women and girls because of “their greater 
susceptibility to poverty, illiteracy, and lower social status,” making it 
more difficult for women and girls to escape HTSE once they are 
enveloped in it.35 Economic disparities have contributed to the continued 
rise of HTSE, mostly in developed nations, and are aided by “cultural 
views of women as less valuable than men.”36 These views produce “a 
more tolerant view of prostitution and sexual violence”37 leading to a 
general lack of public pressure to diminish HTSE in areas where it is the 
most prevalent.38 
While the root of human trafficking is poverty, its continuation and 
growth is fed by demand. Much of this “demand” is from the developed 
world, while the “supply” of victims is from the developing world.39 People 
who purchase sexual services, a majority of whom are men, “rarely think 
about the prostitutes with whom they have sexual relations” and either do 
 
more likely to lead labor trafficking investigations (29%) than sex trafficking 
investigations (7%).”).   
30. Id. 
31. See Maciel-Matos, supra note 6, at 330-34 (stating that “[p]overty creates an 
environment where women and young people, in seeking to improve their 
economic condition, can more easily fall prey to traffickers’ false promises of a 
better life elsewhere.”). 
32. Id. at 330 (stating that human trafficking is successful because traffickers prey on 
“people who are already struggling to survive on the lowest rungs of the 
socioeconomic hierarchy.”). 
33. Id. at 332. 
34. Id. at 330. 
35. Id. at 331. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Kyle Kim, U.S. Report: Worst Human Trafficking in Africa, Middle East, SOCIAL 
CAPITAL REVIEW (Jul. 18, 2011), http://socialcapitalreview.org/u-s-report-worst-
human-trafficking-in-africa-middle-east/ (highlighting how the worst offenders 
are in Africa and the Middle East). 
39. SHELLEY, supra note 2, at 5 (stating that “the supply exists because globalization 
has caused increasing economic and demographic disparities between the 
developing and developed world” and that “current world conditions have created 
increased demand and supply.”). 
Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet · Vol. 5 · 2014  
Nowhere to Hide 
207 
not care, never bother to find out, or turn a blind eye to whether those 
women are there consensually.40 This attitude makes victims exponentially 
more difficult to identify as those with the best access to them are doing the 
least to help them.  
Human trafficking is “built on widespread individual human 
suffering”41 and is difficult to combat due to the multiplicity of actors, the 
statistical unlikelihood of punishment, and the incredible financial 
advantages for participants.42 To that end, the international community 
came together in 2000 in Palermo, Italy to set up a framework to fight this 
complicated, transnational, and increasingly lucrative criminal practice. 
This framework is known as the Palermo Protocol. 
B. Defining Human Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation 
The U.N. definition of HTSE is relatively expansive compared to 
national definitions. Trafficking in persons is defined in the Palermo 
Protocol as: 
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of 
persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, 
of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position 
of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the 
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the 
exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual 
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to 
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.43 
Human trafficking “does not require an international border to be 
crossed” nor “necessarily involve movement or transfer of the victim.”44 It 
can occur transnationally or completely within a single State, which is 
known as domestic trafficking. The Palermo Protocol definition of human 
trafficking (“U.N. definition”) covers both possibilities. It also 
 
40. Id. at 39 (suggesting that men “happily hire the services of a younger woman who 
is compliant and affordable without thinking of why these services are so 
accessible.”). 
41. Id. at 39-40. 
42. See Infra Part II. See also Quick Facts About Human Trafficking, END HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING NOW (last visited November 8, 2013), 
http://www.endhumantraffickingnow.com/quick-facts-about-human-trafficking/ 
(stating that the “risk of prosecution is often small in most countries. Punishment 
for the crime of human trafficking is lower than for trafficking drugs.”). 
43. A Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime, art. 3, Dec. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319 
[hereinafter The Supplementary Protocol]. 
44. BENJAMIN PERRIN, INVISIBLE CHAINS: CANADA’S UNDERGROUND WORLD OF 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING 8 (2010). 
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encompasses sex trafficking, exploitative labor trafficking, child soldiers, 
and even organ trafficking.45  
Since the adoption of the Palermo Protocol, all “relevant U.N. 
organizations and agencies, as well as other intergovernmental 
organizations” working on HTSE have accepted and use this definition.46 
The U.N.’s adoption of this definition of trafficking was controversial—
particularly due to the use of the phrase “sexual exploitation.” Certain 
groups advocated the removal of this phrase, arguing that it could 
transform the issue of sex trafficking into one that “turn[s] on whether one 
believes that all activities in the sex industry constitute ‘sexual 
exploitation’ or whether one believes the term . . . only include[s] situations 
of forced labor, servitude, or slavery-like practices.”47 The delegates 
crafting the Palermo Protocol eventually compromised by listing the 
“various forms of trafficking.”48 However, this same controversy continues 
at the national and regional level as national legislatures and law 
enforcement agencies grapple with drafting legislation that adequately 
responds to the multiplicity of factors involved in combating HTSE. 
The broad scope of this definition has led to criticism. Such critics 
believe that since the definition covers so many different types of 
exploitation, it “obscures important differences between trafficking and 
exploitation as well as between different exploitative practices.”49 On the 
other hand, the wide scope of this definition “extends beyond those 
involved in moving [the victim] into the situation of exploitation to 
potentially include the individual exploiter [the person who physically uses 
the victim for sex].”50  
C. Legal Problems Resulting From Human Trafficking for Sexual 
Exploitation 
A big obstacle to the implementation of the U.N. definition on an 
international scale is the lack of a definition of the word “exploitation.” 
While the U.N. definition of human trafficking is reflected in the anti-
trafficking statutes of the majority of States,51 the differences in how 
countries define “exploitation” results in a plethora of important 
 
45. SHELLEY, supra note 2, at 11 (summarizing the Palermo Protocol). 
46. ANNE T. GALLAGHER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING 42 
(2010). 
47. LeRoy G. Potts, Jr., Note, Global Trafficking in Human Beings: Assessing the 
Success of the United Nations Protocol to Prevent Trafficking in Persons, 35 
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 227, 238 (2003). 
48. Id. 
49. GALLAGHER, supra note 42, at 49. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 42 (remarking on how “since 2000, the majority of States have enacted 
comprehensive anti-trafficking laws that generally reflect the internationally 
agreed definition”).  
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differences among said statutes. Although there is no international 
consensus as to what constitutes exploitation, “most activists and scholars 
appear to accept the validity of some kind of a ‘seriousness’ threshold.”52 
Due to the lack of a universally enforced definition of HTSE, not all 
situations that constitute HTSE under the U.N. definition are prosecuted as 
such within a given State. This hinders cooperation between States. 
Additionally, because the prosecutions of these incidents are not 
transparent to the international community and do not use the same 
definition, there is very little usable case law for lawmakers to utilize. 
These problems erode the successes of the practical application of the 
Palermo Protocol and need to be addressed in order for the international 
community to make significant inroads in the fight against HTSE. 
1. Lack of a Universal Definition 
Customarily, UNTOC and the Supplementary Protocol leave the form 
and content of national legislation prohibiting HTSE to the discretion of 
each national government.53 An unintended byproduct of this is that an act 
of human trafficking in one country is not necessarily an act of human 
trafficking in another. For example, Canada’s definition of human 
trafficking is far narrower than the U.N. definition.54 The Canadian 
definition of HTSE only addresses persons who are recruited through the 
use of force or the threat of force. Therefore, someone who was forced into 
trafficking to pay a debt or through psychological manipulation would not 
be criminally liable for HTSE in Canada.55 The U.N. definition, on the 
other hand, includes those who are recruited through coercion.56  
 
52. Id. 
53. The Supplementary Protocol, supra note 39, at art. 8-9 (stating that the “State 
Parties shall establish comprehensive policies, programmes and other measures to 
prevent and combat human trafficking”). 
54. PERRIN, supra note 40, at 137 (arguing that the Canadian definition “centres on 
the victim’s fear for safety or the safety of someone known to the victim” and 
fails to address other methods which should be included including “deception, 
fraud, abuse of power/position of vulnerability, or payment of someone to control 
the victim”). 
55. Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 423 (Can.). This statute states: 
“Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a 
term of not more than five years or is guilty of an offence punishable on summary 
conviction who, wrongfully and without lawful authority, for the purpose of 
compelling another person to abstain from doing anything that he or she has a 
lawful right to do, or to do anything that he or she has a lawful right to abstain 
from doing, 
· (a) uses violence or threats of violence to that person or his or her spouse or 
common-law partner or children, or injures his or her property; 
· (b) intimidates or attempts to intimidate that person or a relative of that person by 
threats that, in Canada or elsewhere, violence or other injury will be done to or 
punishment inflicted on him or her or a relative of his or hers, or that the property 
of any of them will be damaged; 
· (c) persistently follows that person; 
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This definitional issue is also a problem within the United States 
framework for combating human trafficking: the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act (“TVPA”). The U.S. passed the TVPA in October 2000 with 
the goal of “preventing human trafficking overseas, the protection and 
assistance of victims in the U.S. and more stringent prosecution and 
punishment of traffickers.”57 This Act, which claims to fulfill the 
requirements of the Palermo Protocol, in fact limits its HTSE definition.58 
Under the TVPA, victims of trafficking are eligible for special visas to 
remain in the U.S. while their traffickers are prosecuted but only if they 
have been victim to “severe trafficking.”59 This “severe” standard is 
problematic and “prevents many victims of human trafficking” from 
receiving the special visa, creates “the impression that other types of 
human trafficking are less offensive,” and requires law enforcement to 
“classify” a victim of human trafficking.60 This classification process often 
hinges on the assistance a victim can provide to the prosecution of her 
trafficker. However, “the more severe the trafficking, the more a victim 
may be psychologically incapable of assisting law enforcement after 
rescue” and as such, may not qualify as a victim of severe trafficking.61 
The narrowness of the TVPA definition is simply the tip of the iceberg. 
Each of the U.S.’s fifty individual states has its own HTSE law.62 This 
 
· (d) hides any tools, clothes or other property owned or used by that person, or 
deprives him or her of them or hinders him or her in the use of them; 
· (e) with one or more other persons, follows that person, in a disorderly manner, 
on a highway; 
· (f) besets or watches the place where that person resides, works, carries on 
business or happens to be; or 
· (g) blocks or obstructs a highway.” 
56. The Supplementary Protocol, supra note 39, at art. 3(a) (stating that “the 
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means 
of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion” is human trafficking). 
57. Id. at 329. 
58. Maciel-Matos, supra note 6, at 336-37 (asserting that “the ‘severe forms of 
trafficking’ language raises problems by limiting “assistance and benefits to a 
particular type of victim, while creating the impression that other types of human 
trafficking are less offensive.”). 
59. Id. at 336 (“Severe trafficking is: (a) Sex trafficking in which a commercial sex 
act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to 
perform such act has not attained [eighteen] years of age; or (B) the recruitment, 
harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, 
through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to 
involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage or slavery.”). 
60. Id. at 336-37. 
61. Id. 
62. Wyoming Becomes 50th State to Outlaw Human Trafficking, POLARIS PROJECT 
(Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.polarisproject.org/media-center/press-releases/742-
wyoming-becomes-50th-state-to-outlaw-human-trafficking (announcing that 
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creates additional complications as these laws “are as varied as the states 
themselves.”63 As the current state of the law in the U.S. illustrates, HTSE 
definitions are not uniform even within the same country. Without 
uniformity, prosecution of HTSE remains patchwork and cooperation 
efforts stalled. Without cooperation, HTSE continues to flourish.   
2. Transnational Issues That Hinder Cooperation 
Domestic HTSE, situations in which persons are trafficked within their 
own State, occurs in a majority of countries.64 However, victims of HTSE 
can also be victims brought to a State from other States.65 To combat this 
type of HTSE, international coordination is essential as “State-centered 
approaches to combat trafficking are proving obsolete and futile since 
human trafficking knows no [S]tate boundaries.”66  
Whether the trafficking is international or domestic, human trafficking 
networks “are often highly organized, sophisticated mobile enterprises,” 
and are capable of quickly relocating “to avoid detection and 
prosecution.”67 Catching up to these mobile networks requires significant 
cooperation between different law enforcement agencies within a State and 
even more coordination when the networks are transnational.  
To stop the international traffic in human beings, a tool such as the 
Offenders of Humanity Database must expose the patterns of HTSE 
criminal networks to the public. This will ensure these networks are 
targeted by anti-trafficking legislation and law enforcement efforts. 
Unfortunately, currently networks are able to flourish invisible to public 
view.68 For example, many wealthy pedophiles from countries like the 
 
Wyoming became the last American state to pass a HTSE law when Governor 
Mead signed the state’s “first bill to protect victims and prosecute traffickers”). 
63. Kelly Heinrich and Kavitha Sreeharsha, The State of State Human Trafficking 
Laws, 52 THE JUDGES’ JOURNAL 28, 29 (Winter 2013) (discussing how 
widely HTSE state laws vary across the United States).  
64. Sex Trafficking in the United States, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AID, 
http://www.crisisaid.org/ICAPDF/Trafficking/traffickstats.pdf (Despite the U.S.’s 
proactive prosecution of HTSE, almost 300,000 American children are at risk for 
trafficking into the sex industry). 
65. Human Trafficking FAQs, U.N.O.D.C. (last visited Nov. 4, 2013), 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-
trafficking/faqs.html#What_is_human_trafficking (stating how “trafficking often 
occurs from less developed countries to more developed countries”). 
66. Brewer, supra note 15, at 47 (2010) (discussing how globalization has facilitated 
human trafficking). 
67. Miriam Cohen, Note, Piracy and Human Trafficking, 16 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
201, 223 (2010) (discussing how globalization has provided an ideal environment 
for trafficking networks to maximize their territory). 
68. Darla Carmichael, Human Trafficking In My Backyard, SEX, VIOLENCE, 
PARENTING & OTHER CHARACTER FLAWS (Aug. 22, 2012 9:37 AM), 
http://darlasbooks.wordpress.com/2012/08/23/human-trafficking-in-my-backyard 
(“Someone mentioned human trafficking. My first thought was – no, this is Fort 
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United States, Japan, and parts of Western Europe participate in child 
prostitution through the sex tourism industry in Asia and Latin America. 
This industry is officially illegal but is secretly subsidized by corruption. 
The sex tourism industry generally flourishes in States “that do not have a 
stable or strong economy,” and those where “a large part of the population 
is undernourished . . . and is dying of the consequences of malnutrition.”69 
Since “minors constitute a large percentage of the population,”70 these 
States are breeding grounds for HTSE. Travel agencies, hotel owners, and 
governments alike, their cooperation hidden from public view, facilitate 
and promote this industry.71 As the illegal sex industry “flourishes by 
exploiting the misery of famished families,”72 the public is often unaware 
of the institutions in their own home countries that support this miserable 
enterprise. Once the general public is aware of the illegal sex industry, it 
may be easier to significantly diminish it.  
3. Lack of Transparency in Prosecution 
Despite the sophistication of the HTSE enterprises, human traffickers 
are being prosecuted. “Five thousand trafficking prosecutions were 
recorded globally” in 2008 alone, leading to “almost three thousand 
convictions.”73 However, in 2008, an estimated 2.5 million persons, two-
thirds of whom are women and children, were forced into commercial sex 
trafficking.74 In this context with this number of victims, these conviction 
numbers are unacceptably low; especially considering how the number of 
individuals trafficked is likely substantially higher than the official 
estimates given the covert nature of the HTSE.  
In addition, many of these prosecutions and the process by which they 
come about are not visible to the public. Neither are the all the actors that 
participate in HTSE. This lack of transparency inhibits societies from 
recognizing the true scope of the problem. An important reason for this 
 
Worth, an urban city with a uniquely small town feel. Nothing ever happens in 
Fort Worth.”). 
69. Id. at 582 (elaborating on the socio-economic background of the supplying 
countries). 
70. Id. (pointing out that child prostitution is mainly present in underdeveloped and 
developing countries). 
71. Karene Jullien, Note, The Recent International Efforts to End Commercial Sexual 
Exploitation of Children, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 579, 585 (2003) 
(discussing how some governments in developing countries ignore or profit from 
sex tourism involving minors). 
72. Id. at 582-83 (discussing how the fight for survival leads children in indigent 
families to become engaged in prostitution).  
73. PERRIN, supra note 40, at 118 (discussing the small number of HTSE related 
convictions in Canada). 
74. SHELLEY, supra note 2, at 5 (citing data from the International Labour 
Organization). 
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problem is the diversity of actors that participate in HTSE.75 Some of these 
actors are criminal in that the entirety of their occupation violates HTSE 
laws; others have an official job that is legal, but use it to facilitate HTSE 
crimes; still others walk the fine line between legal and illegal.76  
Criminal actors could be anyone—from the main organizers and 
regional leaders to the procurers (those who actually “obtain” the victims) 
or pimps.77 While the roles of individuals vary in each criminal group and 
the context of different cases, all of these actors are directly involved in 
HTSE, and are often the same nationality as their victims.78 These 
individuals are more likely to be charged and prosecuted because they are 
among the most visible members of the trafficking operation.  
The other types of participants are legal and semi-legal actors. These 
individuals generally benefit from human trafficking indirectly, and are 
deliberately or willfully blind in facilitating HTSE.79 They may be taxi 
drivers, travel agents, and restaurant owners.80 While their day jobs do not 
directly involve them in HTSE, they use these roles to facilitate HTSE as a 
business enterprise. For example, a landlord may rent out rooms to women 
he knows are being forced to exchange sexual services for money. He 
benefits through the rent provided, and the traffickers get a safe place to 
exploit their victims. Under the current HTSE international framework, he 
is generally not prosecuted although he is aiding and abetting HTSE by 
providing a safe place for traffickers to exploit and profit. Since the 
landlord plays a significant role in facilitating HTSE, this Note seeks to end 
the impunity of individuals like the landlord who facilitate HTSE by 
making their facilitation public.  
All of these actors, whether directly involved in HTSE criminal 
networks or simply indirectly supporting or participating in the human 
trafficking system, must be prosecuted for HTSE to be effectively 
eliminated. Heightened public awareness of sex trafficking could 
incentivize prosecutors to prosecute traffickers with greater zeal. As this 
Note discusses later, the public is generally unaware of HTSE prosecution 
efforts.81 This results in an absence of public support for combating HTSE, 
 
75. Id. at 6 (discussing the diversity of actors who participate in human trafficking). 
76. See infra note 164. 
77. MINNA VIUHKO & ANNIINA JOKINEN, HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND ORGANIZED 
CRIME: TRAFFICKING FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ORGANIZED PROCURING IN 
FINLAND 76 (2009) (discussing the division of labor between various criminal 
actors involved in HTSE). 
78. Id. at 76-77 (explaining that the main organizers of pandering groups operating in 
Finland are often Estonians or Russians). 
79. Id. at 81 (describing the roles of different legal and semi-legal actors). 
80. Id. (identifying categories such as taxi drivers, owners and staff of hotels, bars 
and restaurants, as well as ferry companies, as beneficiaries of HTSE).  
81. See supra Part III. 
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which allows prosecutors to get away with offering minimal sentences for 
individuals perpetrating HTSE.82 
Canada is an example of a country with weak public support for 
combating HTSE, brought on among other things by a non-transparent 
prosecution system. This lack of support results in weak sentences for 
HTSE crimes that contribute more to impunity than actual prosecution. For 
example, the first person convicted of human trafficking in Canada was in 
2008, five years after the Palermo Protocol supposedly was in effect in 
Canada.83 After pleading guilty to charges of human trafficking, the 
trafficker received less than four years in prison. He was found guilty of 
forcing both a fourteen-year-old girl and an eighteen-year-old woman into 
prostitution for two years through violence and threats. He received 
hundreds of thousands of dollars from his victims.84 While prosecution of 
traffickers is increasing in Canada, progress of prosecuting more traffickers 
is slow as officials continue to deport witnesses and charge traffickers with 
lesser offenses that carry far lower sentences in an effort to keep cases from 
being taken to the Supreme Court.85 If the Canadian efforts to fight HTSE 
were more transparent, prosecutors, judges, and law enforcement officials 
alike would be incentivized to vigorously pursue and impose just sentences 
and fully implement Canada’s anti-trafficking laws.  
4. Lack of Case Law 
While many countries have national legislations prohibiting HTSE, 
very few use them to the extent necessary to competently prosecute and 
diminish HTSE. In 2011, the UNODC developed a database in an effort to 
“increase both the capacity and awareness of the law enforcement to better 
respond to trafficking . . .  [and to] . . . provide immediate, public access to 
officially documented instances of this crime.”86 Access to reliable and 
informative case law is necessary due to the “lack of knowledge and 
understanding on the global stage” of HTSE.87  
 
82. Margie Reese, Sex Traffickers Must Be Dealt Heavier Penalties, THE 
SOUTHWESTERN COLLEGE SUN, (Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.theswcsun.com/sex-
traffickers-must-be-dealt-heavier-penalties/ (discussing Proposition 35 and the 
hope that sex traffickers will face higher sentences). 
83. Tamara Cherry, Human Traffic Twist, TORONTO SUN, (Dec. 26, 2008), 
http://www.torontosun.com/news/canada/2008/12/26/7852636-sun.html 
(discussing how human trafficking was added to the Canadian Criminal Code in 
November 2005, but the first convictions were in 2008). 
84. PERRIN, supra note 40, at 123-24 (discussing Canada’s first convicted human 
trafficker). 
85. Id. at 130 (discussing the apparent reluctance of Canadian prosecutors to bring 
human trafficking charges against criminal actors). 
86. Id. (“The database contains details on victims’ and perpetrators’ nationalities, 
trafficking routes, verdicts and other information related to prosecuted cases from 
across the world.”).  
87. Id. (discussing how the database aims at increasing awareness and understanding 
regarding the legal issues behind human trafficking).  
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The UNODC database, however, does not go far enough. Contribution 
to the database is voluntary and it is often individual law firms or NGOs 
that make the contributions.88 These contributors may not be in the best 
position to report accurate information on these cases, and their 
information may come solely from the specific areas in a country where 
they operate. Case law needs to come from an official and verifiable 
source, such as the national governments of these countries as they are in 
the best position to report on HTSE prosecutions and incidents from all 
over their respective countries.  
The lack of HTSE case law creates significant problems in prosecuting 
HTSE, as there is a lack of legal precedent that prosecutors can use in 
prosecuting HTSE cases. This leads to less HTSE cases prosecuted, which 
may deter law enforcement from investigating alleged HTSE incidents. 
These conclusions are supported by the Urban Institute-Northeastern 
Institute June 2012 study researching HTSE in the U.S. This study found 
that state prosecutors in the U.S. have difficulty pursuing human trafficking 
cases because they, among other factors, “lack legal precedent and case law 
to guide effective use of state human trafficking laws.”89 This demonstrates 
how even one of the most powerful and wealthy countries in the world with 
an active HTSE prosecution framework continues to struggle with HTSE 
due to the lack of legal precedent. This issue must be addressed for any 
successful global effort to significantly reduce HTSE. 
Four problems damage efforts to combat HTSE: the lack of a universal 
definition, limited international cooperation, minimal transparency in 
prosecutions, and limited case law. While some of these problems are 
addressed in the international legal framework to combat HTSE, many still 
exist and hinder progress to eliminate HTSE. Any internationally 
successful campaign to combat HTSE needs to effectively address these 
four problems and the other major deficiencies in the Supplementary 
Protocol. The time for such a campaign is now. 
II.  DEFICIENCIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO 
COMBAT HUMAN TRAFFICKING FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION  
The four problems with the current battle against HTSE have been 
partially caused and exacerbated by the deficiencies in the Palermo 
Protocol. These deficiencies need to be solved. 
 
88. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, Human Trafficking Case Law 
Database, https://www.unodc.org/cld/en/about/contributors.html (last visited Oct. 
25, 2013) (listing institutions and individuals who have contributed to the 
UNODC human trafficking case law database). 
89. URBAN INSTITUTE, Identifying Challenges to Improve the Investigation of State 
and Local Human Trafficking Cases, 1, 7, (2012), 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412592-State-and-Local-Human-
Trafficking-Cases.pdf (discussing the challenges law enforcement and 
prosecutors face in prosecuting cases using human trafficking statutes). 
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A.  The International Legal Framework  
The international framework used to combat HTSE is made up of 
UNTOC and the Supplementary Protocol. UNTOC was signed in 
December of 2000 in Palermo, Italy, and came into force in December 
2003.90 UNTOC focuses on organized crime generally. The language of 
UNTOC “represents the interests of governments rather than individuals.”91 
This important distinction accounts for the lack of language concerning 
support for trafficking victims. Instead, any victim support is provided to 
victims through a Party’s respective national legislation. With these issues 
in mind, UNTOC was supplemented through U.N. Resolution by the 
Supplementary Protocol, which focuses on HTSE and emphasizes women 
and children as victims of sex trafficking.92   
Taken together, UNTOC and the Supplementary Protocol, along with 
the Conference of the Parties established by UNTOC as an oversight 
mechanism,93 make up the international legal framework to combat HTSE. 
This framework, however, is deficient in a number of ways and these 
deficiencies cripple the effectiveness of this framework. 
B.  The Deficiencies in the UNTOC in the Context of Human 
Trafficking  
The drafters of UNTOC and the Supplementary Protocol drafted both 
instruments with weak and problematic language, which creates 
deficiencies with serious consequences. These deficiencies cripple the 
effectiveness of both UNTOC and the Supplementary Protocol and 
contribute to the continuance of what former U.N. Secretary General Kofi 
Annan considers “one of the most egregious violations of human rights 
[human trafficking] the United Nations now confronts.”94 Some of the 
deficiencies created by the language of UNTOC are in Articles 27 and 28.  
Article 27 is entitled “Law enforcement cooperation” and discusses 
law enforcement cooperation on organized crime.95 The Article begins with 
 
90. SHELLEY, supra note 2, at 10 (discussing the adoption of the United Nations 
Convention on Transnational Organized Crime). 
91. Id. (explaining why the text of UNTOC does not address the needs of trafficking 
victims and national and regional legislation on human trafficking). 
92. G.A. Res. 55/25, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Nov. 15, 2000) (“Adopts the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially of 
Women and Children . . .”). 
93. GALLAGHER, supra note 42,  at 466 (finding that the role of the Conference of the 
Parties is “to promote and review implementation of UNTOC” and is “entrusted 
with oversight function.”). 
94. Kofi A. Annan, Forward to United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto, Nov. 15, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209. 
95. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the 
Protocols Thereto, art. 27, Nov. 15, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209 [hereinafter 
UNTOC]. 
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strong language: “State Parties shall cooperate closely with one another” 
on the crimes demarcated in UNTOC [emphasis added].96 Additionally, 
“each State Party shall, in particular, adopt effective measures” of creating 
and enhancing modes of communication between parties [emphasis 
added].97 This robust language is essential to the success of UNTOC 
because it holds the State Parties to a specific promise in order to comply 
with UNTOC. 
However, the strong language is not consistent throughout the Article 
and stops short of requiring Parties to make agreements or arrangements 
that facilitate cooperation. For example, instead of using language such as 
shall enter into or shall adopt, the Article suggests that States “shall 
consider entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements 
on direct cooperation” [emphasis added].98 This less forceful language 
allows the State Parties to avoid the requirements laid out in the text while 
still objectively complying with UNTOC. Article 27 moves on to inform 
Parties that they “may consider this Convention as the basis for mutual law 
enforcement cooperation” and “shall make full use of agreements or 
arrangements . . . to enhance the cooperation between their law 
enforcement agencies” whenever appropriate.99  The Article concludes with 
“State Parties shall endeavour to cooperate within their means to respond to 
transnational organized crime committed through the use of modern 
technology.”100 
Weak language, such as “shall endeavor,” “may consider,” or “shall” 
with the qualifier “whenever appropriate” grants too much discretion to the 
Parties and enables them to avoid the Article’s directives while still 
objectively complying with UNTOC. As such, it provides no compulsion 
for States to engage in activities that are essential to combat HTSE. The 
Article also fails to delineate any particular framework or avenue for the 
specified cooperation. It also does not provide any means of tracking the 
compliance with this Article. In sum, this weak language allows Parties to 
technically comply with UNTOC without actually taking the steps required 
to do so.  
Article 28 is simpler than Article 27 as it does not require the Parties to 
adopt or create anything new. Instead, it asks each State Party to collect 
data and analyze the organized crime within its borders, to share this 
analytical expertise with one another, and to monitor the effectiveness of its 
developed strategies to diminish organized crime.101 While each of these 
requests is crucial to effective international cooperation on this issue, 
Article 28 does not require the State Parties take such steps. Instead, this 
 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id.  
99. Id. 
100. Id.  
101. Id. at art. 28. 
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Article only provides that each State Party “shall consider” taking the 
above actions.102  
Article 28 fails to provide a means of accountability of the 
implementation of UNTOC’s provisions because the State Parties are not 
required to collect data on organized crime (which would include human 
trafficking). Without this data a State will not know whether its efforts to 
combat are successful. And if such efforts are unsuccessful, a State will not 
know that it needs to develop a new strategy. As with Article 27, much of 
the language in Article 28 is far too weak to adequately support the 
exceptionally important provisions it contains. 
 
2.     The Deficiencies Illustrated Through the Story of Cambodia 
 
Cambodia is a party to UNTOC and an enlightening example of its 
deficiencies.103  Unofficial estimates of sex trafficking suggest “there are as 
many as 15,000 prostituted persons from Phnom Pehn and that up to 35% 
of them have been smuggled into Cambodia from China or Vietnam.”104 
These “girls are bound by contracts to a brothel owner” and have to pay off 
this debt through providing sexual services before they can keep any of 
their earnings for themselves.105 
Cambodia is listed as a Tier 2 country by the U.S. State Department 
Trafficking in Persons Report,106 which signifies that Cambodia does not 
comply with the minimum requirements of the TVPA107 but is making 
significant efforts to do so.108 Despite Cambodia’s alleged significant 
efforts, the Cambodian police cannot put “the Svay Pak brothel area 
outside Phnom Penh, where children are exploited in the sex trade” out of 
business as it “continues to operate despite numerous attempts by police to 
close it down.”109 According to the State Department Report, the “sale of 
 
102. Id. 
103. UNTOC, supra note 90, at list of parties. 
104. Donna M. Hughes, Laura J. Sporcic & Nadine Z. Mendelsohn, Coalition Against 
Trafficking in Women: Factbook on Global Sexual Exploitation (October 2004), 
http://www.continuetolearn.uiowa.edu/laborctr/child_labor/materials/pdf/modules
/child_trafficking.pdf. 
105. Id. 
106. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 2, at 106 (“Cambodia is a source, transit, and 
destination country for men, women, and children who are subjected to forced 
labor and sex trafficking.”). 
107. Id. at 41 (explaining that Tier 2 Countries are those that “do not fully comply with 
the TVPA’s minimum standards but are making significant efforts to bring 
themselves into compliance with those standards”).  
108. Id. at 107  (“The Government of Cambodia does not fully comply with the 
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making 
significant efforts to do so.”). 
109. Id. 
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virgin girls continues to be a serious problem in Cambodia.”110 Cambodian 
men “form the largest source of demand for child prostitution though a 
significant number of men from the United States and Europe, as well as 
other Asian countries, travel to Cambodia to engage in child sex 
tourism.”111 Cambodia not only has large numbers of persons trafficked 
internally, it also acts as a transit center for victims trafficked to Thailand 
and Vietnam.112 Cambodia’s lack of partnerships with Thailand, Vietnam, 
and other countries in the region hinder any effort it may be exerting to 
curb HTSE, as they are unable to coordinate anti-HTSE efforts without 
these partnerships.113  
Aside from lack of cooperation, the State Department has singled out 
another issue in its recommendations to Cambodia:114 the fact that there are 
serious prosecution, transparency, and impunity issues as a result of 
corruption. Without an international monitoring system, Cambodia is 
unable to fulfill its obligation to increase prosecutions as required by the 
Palermo Protocol. For example, in 2010 “three convicted foreign 
pedophiles–one of whom is also a sex trafficking offender and one of 
whom was convicted in the largest child sex offender case in Cambodian 
history–were pardoned and released early from prison.”115 Additionally, in 
2011 the former head of the Phnom Penh Municipal Police’s Anti-Human 
Trafficking and Juvenile Protection Department “was convicted in absentia 
and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment on complicity charges, 
including accepting payments from brothels in exchange for protection and 
information on future raids.”116 Corruption charges and concerns coming 
 
110. Id. 
111. Id.; see also supra notes 69-72. 
112. HUMANTRAFFICKING.ORG, Structure of Cambodian Taskforce on Human 
Trafficking, 
http://www.humantrafficking.org/uploads/publications/Coordination_Structure_-
_Diagram1.pdf (listing Vietnam and Thailand as target areas for a national 
taskforce on human trafficking). 
113. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 2, at, 107 (recommending that Cambodia 
“increase engagement with governments of destination countries”). 
114. Id. at 107. 
115. Id. at 108. 
116. Id. (recommending that Cambodia “increase engagement with governments of 
destination countries”); see also (discussing allegations of “law enforcement and 
government officials are believed to have accepted bribes to facilitate the 
trafficking and sex trade. There are reports of government officials who are 
complicit in the trafficking by accepting bribes.”); Cambodia: Human Trafficking 
Crackdown Also Hits HIV Prevention, PLUSNEWS (Oct. 21, 2008), 
http://www.plusnews.org/Report/81036/CAMBODIA-Human-trafficking-
crackdown-also-hits-HIV-prevention (“Sex workers called the crackdown a 
‘moral crusade’ in protests during June, after reports revealed that the police were 
detaining sex workers as traffickers and sometimes demanding sexual favors and 
bribes.”). 
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out of this incident were never investigated or addressed.117 Local observers 
believe that “the cause of impunity” afforded to perpetrators contribute to 
trafficking.118 
Without a proper incentive, Cambodia will continue to allow 
corruption and impunity to reign while continuing to make “significant 
efforts” to combat HTSE. If there is increased transparency the rest of 
world will know when to provide pressure to facilitate change. As 
demonstrated above, the deficiencies in UNTOC exacerbate the HTSE 
issues already confronted by Cambodia. A tool is needed to solve these 
problems as well as to confront the other obstacles to HTSE elimination in 
Cambodia: impunity and corruption. 
 
3.     The Deficiencies Illustrated Through the Story of Canada 
 
Canada is another example of a country that exhibits the Palermo 
Protocol’s deficiencies. Despite having signed the Supplementary Protocol 
and UNTOC, Canada did not make “trafficking in persons” a criminal 
offense until late 2005.119 Canada only added this offense after 
experiencing political embarrassment when the country was rated Tier 2 in 
the State Department Human Trafficking Report of 2003.120 The first 
conviction for HTSE did not occur until June 2008.121  
A few years ago, UNODC asked Canada to provide information on 
human trafficking prosecutions and convictions in Canada, presumably for 
the UNODC human trafficking case law database.122 However, Canada 
declined to provide this information because “no central database in 
Canada collects this information and most prosecutions are carried out 
locally.” 123 As a result, there were no official statistics to report.124 
Additionally, when Crown prosecutors looked for case law to find 
sentencing references for their new HTSE cases, they could not find any.125 
 
117. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 2, at 108. 
118. Id. 
119. PERRIN, supra note 40, at 118 (Canada took until late 2005 to make ‘trafficking in 
persons’ a Criminal Code offence and did not secure its first conviction until June 
2008.”).  
120. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 2, at 46 (listing Canada as a Tier 2 status 
country). 
121. PERRIN, supra note 40, at 118.  
122. Id. at 120 (“When the federal government was asked recently to provide the 
information to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime for its annual Report on 
Trafficking in Persons.”).  
123. Id. at 118. 
124. Id. at 120. 
125. Id. at 120-21(discussing the lack of case law available due to most sentences did 
not appear in typical databases used by the legal profession making it difficult to 
find case law.). 
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The prosecutors needed these sentencing references because by 2009, 
sentences handed down for the few HTSE cases prosecuted were so pitiful 
that the Canadian Parliament “introduced Bill C-268 in January 2009 [to 
establish] a mandatory minimum sentence of five years for convicted child 
traffickers.”126 But this was only for child traffickers as judges in Canada 
seemed to have “succumbed to the myth of the fallen woman: that women 
forced into prostitution have no value or virtue, so crimes committed 
against them . . . do not merit punishment.”127 This myth has had practical 
consequences “on the handful of pimps who have been convicted of human 
trafficking generally receive overly lenient sentences-a slap on the 
wrist.”128 Currently, Canada is ranked as a Tier 1 country, which is a 
country that meets the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking 
as determined by the U.S. State Department.129 
Despite Canada’s Tier 1 status, many researchers and experts find that 
Canada’s definition of HTSE, as discussed earlier, is too narrow.130 
Additionally, Canada’s “limited coordination between the federal and 
provincial governments on anti-trafficking efforts continue[] to hamper 
more effective collaboration.”131 The U.S. State Department’s 
recommendations encourage Canada to increase its cooperation efforts, 
HTSE data gathering, investigations, and prosecutions of Canadians who 
participate in HTSE abroad.132 As the Canadian example illustrates, a 
country can “comply” with UNTOC but still have serious issues with its 
anti-HTSE network. This is a serious consequence of the deficiencies in 
UNTOC that erodes the success of anti-HTSE efforts.  
D.   Did the Supplementing Protocol “Cure” These Deficiencies? 
Before discussing the practical problems caused by the weak language 
of Articles 27 and 28, it must first be determined whether the 
Supplementary Protocol renders these problems moot. If the 
Supplementary Protocol resolved the deficiencies created by these Articles, 
then the international HTSE framework is solid or “cured,” since the 
 
126. Michael Rappaport, Canada’s Pitiful Track Record in Combating Human 
Trafficking, THE LAWYERS WEEKLY (Feb. 4, 2011), 
http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section=article&articleid=1342 
(discussing sexual exploitation in Canada). 
127. Id.  
128. Id.  
129. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 2, at 38 (A tier 1 country is one that meets “the 
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking”). 
130. Id. (discussing the suggestion that Canada’s definition of exploitation for the 
purposes of the offenses is too narrow.) 
131. Id.  
132. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 2, at 110 (recommending that Canada “increase 
investigations and prosecutions of Canadian child sex tourists abroad; continue 
efforts to improve trafficking data collection; and strengthen coordination among 
national and provincial governments”). 
Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet · Vol. 5 · 2014  
Nowhere to Hide 
222 
Supplementary Protocol “is to be interpreted together with U.N. 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.”133 
1. The Deficiencies That Were “Cured” 
Article 10 the Supplementary Protocol, entitled “Information Exchange 
and Training,” is the section that could cure the deficiencies in UNTOC’s 
Articles 27 and 28. This Article discusses multiple topics on human 
trafficking that State Parties should share.134 It also imposes an obligation 
on the Parties to train and strengthen their law enforcement on the 
prevention of HTSE.135 However, the language of the Supplementary 
Protocol does not reach the crux of the deficiencies in UNTOC because it 
stops short of requiring State Parties to share this information. 
2. The Deficiencies That Were Not “Cured” 
a. Lack of a Universal Definition 
Since the HTSE definition comes from the Supplementary Protocol 
and not UNTOC, the Supplementary Protocol did not cure the lack of a 
universal definition of HTSE.136 While the Parties may have intended the 
definition to be universal, this is not how it is used in practice.137 
b. Lack of International Cooperation 
While Article 10 of the Supplementary Protocol focuses on 
international cooperation on HTSE data, it holds that “State Parties shall, 
as appropriate, cooperate with one another by exchanging information, in 
accordance with their domestic law” [emphasis added]. The Article then 
lists the various subject matters on which the State Parties should 
collaborate.138 The “as appropriate” and “in accordance with their domestic 
law” qualifiers supply the State Parties with far too much discretion in 
complying with the Supplementary Protocol.  
Further expounding this problem, the last section of Article 10 states “a 
State Party that receives information shall comply with any request by the 
State Party that transmitted the information that places restrictions on its 
use.”139 This final provision allows a State, after actually being moved to 
share information, to put any restrictions on the use of the information. 
 
133. The Supplementary Protocol, supra note 39, at art. 1. 
134. Id. at art. 10. 
135. Id. (discussing the necessity that Parties strengthen their law enforcement 
training).  
136. See supra Part I. 
137. Id. 
138. The Supplementary Protocol, supra note 39, at art. 10 (discussing that Parties 
should share information regarding individuals crossing international borders 
with travel documents that do not belong to them or by using means and methods 
that are known practices of organized crime). 
139. Id. 
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Hypothetically, a State could “share” information and render it completely 
useless at the same time by not allowing this information to be used in an 
effective manner.  
 
c. Lack of Transparency in Prosecution 
 
Just as there is no facilitation of international cooperation in the 
Supplementary Protocol, there is also no requirement that States make their 
trafficking information available to the public or to other State Parties. The 
absence of such a provision calls into question the entirety of the 
information sharing aspect of the Supplementary Protocol in Article 10.140 
After all, if countries do not need to gather this information and make it 
transparent by publishing it, then other countries will not know what 
information to request. Also, if countries are not required to gather 
information, a country may not have any information to share when asked. 
The lack of transparency thus continues to wreak havoc with the 
implementation of the Palermo Protocol.  
d.  Lack of Case Law 
Since States are not required to gather or publish information, there is 
even less case law available on HTSE. The Supplementary Protocol did not 
solve this problem as it does not put the obligation to collect information 
on the States. For all of these reasons, the Supplementary Protocol does not 
fix the deficiencies in the international framework to combat HTSE.    
e. Examples of the “Grey Zones” Caused by the Failure of The 
Supplementary Protocol to Cure These Deficiencies 
The presence of the deficiencies in the Palermo Protocol create “grey 
zones” or places where a State is technically complying with the text of the 
treaties without taking the substantive action necessary to curb HTSE such 
as sharing HTSE data with other States. The grey zones present in this 
international framework are best explained through the examples of 
Australia and France, both of whom are parties to the Palermo Protocol and 
are listed as Tier 1 countries in the U.S. State Department’s Trafficking in 
Persons Report. 141  
The U.S. State Department found Australia to comply with the 
Palermo Protocol’s minimum standards.142 Despite this status, Australia 
only prosecuted one person for labor trafficking in 2013, a decrease from 
four convictions and thirteen prosecutions from the previous year.143 
 
140. Id. 
141. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 2, at 51 (stating that Tier 1 status signifies that 
the country is complying with the minimum standards of  the Palermo Protocol, 
as determined by the U.S. State Department). 
142. Id. at 74 (discussing that Australia is complying with the minimum standards to 
eliminate trafficking). 
143. Id. 
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Australia’s anti-trafficking focus is on transnational sex trafficking, which 
while meritorious, comes at the expense of domestic trafficking. In fact, the 
Australian government has “never identified or prosecuted a domestic sex 
trafficking offense”144 and bases the existence of domestic trafficking on 
the amount that is reported.145 This is a flawed strategy as it ignores the 
problems of domestic trafficking until it is officially reported. Instead, 
Australia should proactively try to determine whether there is any domestic 
trafficking in Australia. This would allow Australia to confront domestic 
trafficking problems and curb domestic HTSE instead of hiding from the 
issue all together. 
France is also listed as a Tier 1 country by the U.S. State 
Department.146 While the French government has increased prosecutions 
and the transparency of its anti-trafficking efforts, certain French laws 
cause many trafficking cases to be charged as pimping cases.147 This makes 
international collaboration on HTSE difficult as such collaboration would 
require law enforcement or policy makers to separate out the trafficking 
cases from the pimping cases in order to develop successful strategies to 
target HTSE.148 The mixing of HTSE and pimping cases together makes it 
more difficult to see HTSE patterns and therefore successfully develop 
strategies to confront them. It also increases the difficulty of gathering 
information on HTSE in France to support HTSE prevention efforts and 
share to with international and regional partners. 
As demonstrated through the examples of Australia and France, the 
Palermo Protocol did not fix the problems with the current framework to 
combat HTSE, and in certain circumstances, exacerbated the situation. 
While nations cannot be made to cooperate on HTSE through force, there 
are ways to apply political pressure to facilitate this exchange. But to do so, 
the public must be aware of the situation.  
III. THE SOLUTION: THE OFFENDERS OF HUMANITY DATABASE 
To solve the deficiencies described previously as well as other issues 
with the current framework to combat HTSE, a single, easy-to-use 
instrument is required. This Note proposes, as a tool to fix the current 
 
144. Id. at 73-74. 
145. Strengthening Australia’s Response to Human Trafficking, ANTI-SLAVERY 
PROJECT (Mar. 30, 2010), 
http://www.awcaus.org.au/resources/documents/TraffickingUpdate-UTS.pdf 
(discussing that limited statistical information is available about trafficking in 
Australia only accounts for victims of trafficking who have come into contact 
with law enforcement authorities). 
146. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 2, at 159 (listing France as a Tier 1 Country). 
147. Id. (discussing France’s flaws in classifying crimes as pimping rather than 
trafficking). 
148. Id. (discussing France’s flaws in classifying crimes as pimping rather than 
trafficking). 
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deficiencies with the HTSE framework, increase transparency, and 
diminish the demand for HTSE, the institution of the Offenders of 
Humanity Database (“the Database”). Nations that are Parties to the 
Palermo Protocol will be required to submit the requisite information.149 
This Database should be on the Internet, managed by the UNDOC, and it 
will serve as a centralized information center where NGOs, governments, 
and individuals can obtain information on HTSE and the implementation of 
the Palermo Protocol. Putting this tool on the Internet will make it available 
to an audience that spans socioeconomic backgrounds.150 The Database will 
provide information on HTSE prosecutions and sentences to fill the case 
law void and provide transparency on the implementation of the Palermo 
Protocol. 
A. The Basics of the Database  
The Database will be a combination of an American sex offender 
registry and an international case law database, such as the database run by 
UNODC on human trafficking that was discussed previously.151 The 
Palermo Protocol will be amended to require all of the Parties to submit 
certain data on HTSE to UNODC.152 The Database will replace the current 
UNODC database.  
UNODC is the logical choice to house the Database because UNODC 
already has a system set up to receive information from all over the world. 
It also has the institutional knowledge and expertise along with an 
established funding network.153 While the U.S. State Department is another 
option, as it analyzes and compiles significant amounts of information on 
HTSE for its Trafficking in Persons reports, the information comes from 
U.S. embassies and not the countries themselves.154 Also, since the U.S. 
State Department decides what countries are complying with the standards 
of the Palermo Protocol, there is too much room for suspected bias.155 An 
 
149. GALLAGHER, supra note 42, at 370 (the international community has 
“acknowledged the need for an effective criminal justice response to trafficking”). 
150. Nicole Ferraro, The Internet & the Developing World, INTERNET EVOLUTION (Jan. 
24, 2008), http://www.internetevolution.com/document.asp?doc_id=143698 
(remarking on how “costs have been driven down to affordable levels for people 
on very low incomes”).  
151. U.N.O.D.C., supra note 82. 
152. UNTOC, supra note 90, at art. 30 (a State Party to UNTOC may propose an 
amendment, which will be considered by the Conference of the Parties. If a 
consensus is not reached, the amendment will go to a vote and be passed by a 2/3 
vote). 
153. U.N.O.D.C., supra note 82. 
154. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 2, at 37. 
155. Id. 
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agency not tied to a particular State, like the UNODC, will avoid any such 
accusations.156 
The data that Parties to the Palermo Protocol will be required to submit 
to the Database should at a minimum include: 
· The name, nationality, home address, age, and photograph of all 
persons convicted of any and all HTSE charges;157 
· The country or organization who apprehended the person; 
· The country or organization that tried and convicted the person; 
· The full case law and criminal history of such persons including a 
detailed explanation of the facts of the case;  
· The sentence imposed for all persons convicted of any and all HTSE 
charges, including where and when the sentence will be served.  
The data outlined above should be made accessible to the general 
public free of charge as the UNODC database is now.158 However, when 
national or international law requires, the names of witnesses or victims 
and any other witness or victim identifying information may be redacted to 
protect these witnesses and victims. Additionally, individuals who are 
accused of HTSE offenses but are acquitted will not have their names or 
personal information listed; however, the case law will still be published to 
increase the amount of case law available on HTSE. The Database will also 
have a search feature, which will allow users to search for a particular 
person’s name or an individual country’s case law. If a person’s 
information is already in the Database, then any new charges or additional 
information should be added to his or her entry. These suggestions do not 
provide a ceiling on what information may be provided to the Database but 
rather a floor; the more information provided the better the prosecution and 
prevention efforts will be. 
B. The Purposes of the Database 
The Database has several purposes. It will fill the deficiencies in the 
Palermo Protocol, diminish the demand for HTSE, end the impunity of 
those who facilitate HTSE but are not yet being prosecuted as traffickers, 
and deter others from becoming involved in HTSE in the first place. As 
detailed above, this will be achieved through providing an accessible and 
 
156. Compare Huiqin Du, Many Countries Denounce US Trafficking in Persons 
Reports, CAIXUN NEWS (Jun. 26, 2012) 
http://watchingamerica.com/News/164763/many-countries-denounce-us-
trafficking-in-persons-report/ (discussing the criticisms of the Trafficking in 
Persons Report from around the globe such as Russia refusing “to accept the 
report’s content and pointed out that the U.S. provides its soldiers stationed 
abroad with prostitutes”). 
157. See UNTOC, supra note 90, at art. 18 (this article requires much of this 
information to be shared among nations upon receipt of a mutual assistance 
request). 
158. See U.N.O.D.C., supra note 82 (providing an example of free online database 
similar to what the author is describing).   
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easy-to-use way to determine whether State Parties are implementing the 
Palermo Protocol.  
1.  Building a Universal Definition 
Providing a central location for the compilation on prosecutions of 
HTSE cases will allow a true international definition of HTSE to emerge. 
As cases are prosecuted and prosecutors and judges from around the world 
are able to read these decisions, a definition that fits the crime of HTSE 
will develop as decision-makers will have enough data to make an 
informed decision. While the U.N. definition may be too broad, other 
definitions such as the TVPA’s are too narrow and leave many HTSE cases 
un-prosecutable as such. As countries cooperate and build anti-HTSE 
prosecution strategies from each other’s case law, the practical 
implementation of human trafficking definitions will standardize and bring 
about a true international definition of HTSE.159 
2.  Encouraging International Cooperation 
Through publishing the names and personal information of those 
convicted of HTSE offenses, as well as the applicable case law, countries 
will find it easier to cooperate on HTSE issues because they will be able to 
track HTSE more effectively. For example, with respect to Cambodia’s 
booming sex tourist industry, discussed previously,160 the Database would 
allow Cambodian customs officials to check a tourist’s name before giving 
him a visa. If officials discover that the tourist was convicted of any HTSE 
charges, they can deny him a visa based on the conviction as he is likely a 
sex tourist. These efforts will encourage international cooperation and save 
countries a lot of time and effort in the long run. Countries will now be able 
to keep sex tourists out of the country efficiently and at low cost by simply 
checking the Database.  
By having all State Parties record their HTSE data in one central 
location, each State Party will now know what other information and 
expertise that other State Parties possess. Ideally, this knowledge will aid in 
their requests for mutual assistance.161 
3. Providing Transparency in Prosecutions 
By making each conviction and sentence public, the local populace and 
the international community will be aware of a nation’s efforts towards 
combating HTSE. Moreover, the use of the Database will also expose 
which countries are not actively prosecuting traffickers. Ideally, this 
 
159. HUMAN TRAFFICKING, THIS IS A PROJECT OF SOC 266 GLOBAL CHANGE, The U.N. 
Thematic Debates on Human Trafficking (Nov. 28, 2012), 
http://mkhatdija.wordpress.com/2012/11/28/httpwww.unorggapresident62lettersh
traffickingsummary280708-pdf/ (discussing the lack of a universal definition of 
HTSE in practice). 
160. Supra Part II. 
161. See UNTOC, supra note 90, at art. 18 (details the requirement for mutual legal 
assistance under UNTOC).  
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evidence will allow political pressure to build up both inside and outside 
these countries to force those governments to make combating HTSE a 
priority. Countries will have an incentive to gather this evidence so they are 
able to monitor the progress of their own programs. While it may seem 
natural that countries would already have such a system in place, not all do. 
By putting the information of the nationality of the traffickers, where 
they are found, and including as traffickers anyone who purchases services 
from a trafficked person online, patterns of the illegal sex tourism industry 
will emerge, enabling governments and organizations to organize to 
counteract it. Requiring countries to find, collect, analyze, and send this 
information to a central Database will help countries with their own 
prosecution and prevention efforts. Such information is necessary to 
effectively prosecute those purposefully involved HTSE. This information 
is required to formulate the best enforcement and coordination strategies 
among law enforcement agencies.162  
The Database will also allow other State Parties, NGOs, and 
international entities to track the progress of the implementation of the 
Palermo Protocol. The number of convictions, sentences, and the 
supporting case law will also be accessible on the Internet. When this data 
is then compared to reports, such as the Trafficking in Persons report 
issued by the U.S. Department of State, the world will know who is 
successfully (or at the least attempting) to combat HTSE and who is not. 
For the countries that need more resources, this tracking should help 
indicate exactly where the fundraising dollars should go. At the same time, 
it will aid provide international and local political pressure to do even 
more. 
4. Creating a Usable Body of Case Law 
The Database will serve as a tool for judges, prosecutors and 
lawmakers to avoid problems such as in Canada where HTSE is an official 
crime but Crown prosecutors cannot find sentencing references to 
prosecute the case.163 Once other nations begin depositing their applicable 
court records into the Database, it will provide references for sentences and 
the charges to fit the different crimes that make up HTSE.  
5.  Exposing the Various Participants in HTSE 
The last main purpose of the Database is to expose the various players 
in the HTSE scheme. There is a diverse group of actors in HTSE: those that 
operate illegally, those whose business are themselves legal, and those who 
 
162. See INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, The Crime of Human 
Trafficking: A Law Enforcement Guide to Identification and Investigation, 
http://www.vaw.umn.edu/documents/completehtguide/completehtguide.pdf 
(finding that “victim identification can be one of the most challenging tasks for 
law enforcement”). 
163. See PERRIN, supra note 40, at 121 (referencing problems encountered in Canada 
once HTSE crimes were incorporated into the criminal system).  
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fall somewhere in between.164 Many of these actors operate anonymously 
and are insulated from facing consequences for their actions. One of the 
main impacts the Database will have is the removal of the veil of 
anonymity from these actors. It will help make those who buy and use sex 
slaves accountable just as those who kidnap them and pimp them on the 
streets. This will eat away at the demand for sex trafficking, which is key 
towards successfully reducing the profitability and existence of 
trafficking.165  
In these five ways, the Database will keep the promise the signatures to 
the Palermo Protocol made when they created it in 2000. The purpose of 
the Palermo Protocol as stated in the Supplementary Protocol is: 
(a) To prevent and combat trafficking in persons, paying particular 
attention to women and children; (b) To protect and assist the victims of 
such trafficking, with full respect for their human rights; and (c) To 
promote cooperation among States Parties in order to meet those 
objectives.166 
With the aid of the Database, this purpose can finally be fulfilled.  
C.  The Function of the Database  
The Database will function similar to sex offender registries in the 
United States. These registries “contain the names, addresses, and 
photographs of sex offenders” and are “easily accessible on the Internet.”167 
“A sex offender is anyone who is convicted of a sex crime;”168 however, 
crimes that “qualify as a sex crime vary by state.”169 This type of cataloging 
parallels the people to be included in the Database—they will all be 
convicted of HTSE or associated offenses, but what actions qualify as a 
HTSE or an associated offense will depend on each individual country’s 
definitions and evidence requirements. However, the goal is to standardize 
these definitions and evidence requirements in order to increase the 
efficiency of investigation and prosecution of HTSE incidents. For this 
goal to be accomplished the Database must be as easily accessible as sex 
offender registries generally are in the United States. 
 
164. See SHELLEY, supra note 2, at 84 (“The commitment to trafficking as an activity 
differs between commercial actors.”). 
165. See WORKING GROUP ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, Proposed Areas of Future 
Work (Oct. 10-12, 2011), available at 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/organized_crime/2011_CTOC_COP_
WG4/2011_CTOC_COP_WG4_6/CTOC_COP_WG4_2011_6_E.pdf 
(mentioning how “demand reduction through awareness-raising and 
criminalization of demand is a topic for discussion). 
166. The Supplementary Protocol, supra note 39, at art. 2. 
167. Amanda Agan, Sex Offender Registries: Fear Without Function?, 54 J.L. & 
ECON. 207, 207 (2011). 
168. Id. at 210. 
169. Id. 
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The core of the average American sex offender registry, which will be 
part of the Database, is the address of the offender. Part of a sex offender 
registry’s purpose in the U.S. is to notify the public where these individuals 
live so the community is informed and local law enforcement can keep an 
eye on them.170 This purpose mirrors the Database as the specific location 
of the human trafficker is essential to discover not only the nationality and 
identity of the trafficker, but where he is conducting HTSE. While a 
trafficker can still change locations, being able to pinpoint even a general 
location of trafficking activities will help law enforcement, policy makers, 
and legislatures better tailor their actions to the nature and scope of the 
problem. 
In addition to similar functions, both instruments also have similar 
goals in that both try to prevent these crimes from being re-committed 
through lowering the probability of recidivism through increased 
monitoring. Both the Database and sex offender registries can reduce 
recidivism through making law enforcement aware of offenders and their 
backgrounds.171 They also raise public awareness, which can “increase the 
cost of finding a victim and thus cause offenders to change their 
behavior.”172 Both of these tools operate to destroy the anonymity of those 
that facilitate these crimes, which should prevent the reoccurrence of these 
crimes by both current and future offenders. 
D. Going Beyond the Deficiencies in the Palermo Protocol 
1. Diminishing the Demand for Human Trafficking for Sexual 
Exploitation 
A problem not sufficiently addressed by the current international 
framework to combat HTSE is the demand for HTSE. This is an issue that 
the Working Group on Trafficking in Persons recently addressed.173 Both 
the Palermo Protocol and national legislation do not adequately focus on 
what is fueling the demand for HTSE, which hinders prevention efforts.174  
HTSE is fueled by the demand for compliant and affordable sex 
purchased by clients who rarely think about the people whose services they 
buy.175 The anonymity of the buyers and sellers in sex trafficking makes it 
 
170. Id. at 211-12. 
171. Id. (stating that these registries help to increase police monitoring of sex 
offenders). 
172. Id. at 212. 
173. See WORKING GROUP ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, supra note 155, (mentioning 
how “demand reduction through awareness-raising and criminalization of 
demand” is an issue that must be addressed in the future). 
174. Id.  
175. See SHELLEY, supra note 2, at 39 (discussing how “demand fuels the growth of 
human trafficking.” and comparing men who purchase women for sex to people 
who accept human trafficking in other professions such as clothing manufacturing 
and domestic servants).   
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all too easy to ignore whether the women and children being purchased are 
in the business consensually.176  According to a Finnish study, “the Internet 
[in particular] makes it eas[y] for the customers to remain anonymous; they 
do not have to go and look for women on the street . . . they just make a 
telephone call for an appointment.”177 Ending this anonymity is key to 
reducing the demand for sex slaves. This is what the Database seeks to do. 
In a survey done by the Chicago Alliance Against Sexual Exploitation, 
87% of the men surveyed said “that seeing their photo or name appear in a 
local paper would serve as a deterrent from buying sex.”178 Putting the 
personally identifiable information of the persons engaging in HTSE easily 
accessible online should deter many of those who seek to exploit human 
beings for their own selfish desires.  
2. Ending Impunity: Those Who Exploit Without Consequence 
One of the crucial effects of the Database is the facilitation of 
increased prosecution and conviction of traffickers. This increased 
enforcement will be accomplished through:  
· being a resource for sentencing; 
· making convictions (and therefore the implementation of parts of 
UNTOC) transparent; and 
· providing an avenue to “name and shame” all of the actors involved in 
HTSE by publically reporting on those who fall short of their obligations 
under the Palermo Protocol. 
The Database provides an avenue for all of those who participate in 
HTSE to be listed as international criminals without regard to their level of 
participation. By implementing this Database, all of those who facilitate 
HTSE, particularly the legal and semi-legal actors, will be identified as 
people who participate in HTSE. Including these individuals will end the 
impunity enjoyed by these actors because although they have not faced 
prosecution before, their convictions are crucial to diminishing the 
prevalence of HTSE.179 
3. Increasing Deterrence 
The Database will also promote both specific and general deterrence. 
Specific deterrence is when a person is individually convinced to not take a 
 
176. See PERRIN, supra note 40, at 71-77 (comparing various internet resources and 
telephone services where people can purchase sex remotely). 
177. JOKINEN, supra note 71, at 87-88. 
178. Alizah Salario, U.S. Anti-Sex Trade Aims New Legal Focus on Men Who Buy Sex, 
WENEWS (Apr. 18, 2011), http://m.trust.org/trustlaw/news/us-anti-sex-trade-aims-
new-legal-focus-on-men-who-buy-sex/. 
179. Yuko Narushima, Diplomatic Impunity: Trafficking Women to the United States, 
THE WASHINGTON SPECTATOR (Mar. 1, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonspectator.org/index.php/Human-Trafficking/diplomatic-
impunity-trafficking-women-to-foreign-embassies-in-us.html (discussing how 
members of foreign diplomatic corps who help traffic persons have enjoyed 
impunity until now). 
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certain course of action.180 The Database will promote specific deterrence 
by “naming and shaming,” both traffickers and sex buyers by putting their 
personal information online, which should deter them from continuing to 
engage in HTSE. This easily accessible information may deter these people 
from ever participating in the sexual slave trade again.  
This deterrent will be especially effective for the sex buyers or the 
clients who purchase sexual favors from the people trafficked. These 
people are generally indirect participants in HTSE.181 Sex buyers “have had 
a fairly invisible role” in both prostitution and HTSE efforts as authorities 
generally focus “their efforts on controlling the women . . . and leave their 
customers out of the picture.”182 Since the Internet has helped sex buyers 
remain anonymous and hide their activities, deterring them will require 
using the Internet against them.183  
There is data that identifies the Internet as a successful way to deter 
sex buyers. A study by the Chicago Alliance Against Sexual Exploitation 
shows that “that seeing [the sex buyers’] photo or name appear in a local 
paper would serve as a deterrent from buying sex.”184 In this study, sex 
buyers were questioned about what would deter them from purchasing 
sex.185 Overwhelmingly, the possibilities these individuals admitted would 
have the greatest deterrent effect were options that would publicize their 
choice to purchase sex.186 Each person listed in the Database will be 
specifically deterred from ever becoming involved in HTSE again. 
General deterrence involves convincing the greater populace to refrain 
from participating in a particular activity.187 General deterrence is achieved 
through the Database by making individual traffickers known and easier to 
track, which will require organizations to constantly recruit new individuals 
 
180. EUROPEAN ROAD SAFETY OBSERVATORY, General Deterrence vs. Specific 
Deterrence (2007), 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/wcm/road_safety/erso/knowledge/Content/21_speed
_enforcement/general_deterrence_vs_specific_deterrence.htm (providing a brief 
summary of general and specific deterrence). 
181. SHELLEY, supra note 2, at 39 (Sex buyers “rarely think about the prostitutes with 
whom they have sexual relations.”). 
182. JOKINEN, supra note 71, at 86. 
183. Id. at 85-86 (discussing how the internet is used by those involved in the sex trade 
to stay anonymous).  
184. Salario, supra note 169. 
185. Rachel Durchlag & Samir Goswami, Deconstructing the Demand for 
Prostitution: Preliminary Insights From Interviews With Chicago Men Who 
Purchase Sex, CHICAGO ALLIANCE AGAINST SEXUAL EXPLOITATION (2008), 
http://www.slaverynomore.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Deconstructing-the-
Demand-for-Prostitution.pdf (examining the effect of deterrence in sex trafficking 
by publicizing a sex buyer’s choice to purchase sex through posting his photo and 
name in a local paper, on a billboard, or on the Internet). 
186. Id.  
187. See EUROPEAN ROAD SAFETY OBSERVATORY, supra note 172 (providing a brief 
summary of general and specific deterrence). 
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into the business. This should force the cost of HTSE as a business model 
to skyrocket. This higher overhead should decrease the profitability of 
HTSE. Once this practice is no longer lucrative, there will far less incentive 
for any person to engage in it.188  
Additionally, this Database will also make clear which Parties are not 
implementing the Palermo Protocol by not imposing sufficiently serious 
sentences for convicted traffickers. This should provide incentives for the 
Parties to assign serious sentences to offenders. As more traffickers are 
convicted and sentenced to significant prison terms, people who would 
otherwise be involved in HTSE will be deterred from doing so.189 
Through diminishing demand, ending impunity, and promoting 
deterrence, the Database will attack the organized criminal enterprises 
engaged in HTSE from new directions while strengthening the institutions 
already in place. Together, this multi-pronged attack will quickly diminish 
the prevalence of HTSE and set up the institutional framework to keep it 
from flourishing ever again.  
F.  The Negative Consequences of the Database 
1. Ruining the Innocent 
Despite all the advantages of the Database, there are several potential 
negative consequences. For one thing, it has the ability to destroy the lives 
of those unjustly charged with HTSE offenses, and attaches stigma to a 
person’s name long after he has served his sentence.190 Similar the sex 
offender registries in the U.S., the Database will make life more difficult 
for those listed. Some of the critics of sex offender registries in the U.S. 
argue that the registries do not deter sex offenders, but they do “lower 
property values near offenders,” promote vigilante justice and harassment 
of offenders, and isolate offenders from society to such an extent that 
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reintegration is impossible.191 These consequences of being listed in the 
Database would be particularly egregious if the persons listed were 
innocent. Many countries, especially those in the developing world, do not 
have judicial systems that render fair judgments. The questionable 
determinations by these judicial systems could both undermine the 
Database and ruin the lives of individuals falsely accused of engaging in 
HTSE.192 
2. Lacking in Support For Victims 
With a focus on transparency and increased prosecutions, the Database 
provides no direct relief or services to the victims of HTSE. The Database 
does not provide an incentive for countries to provide victims with 
increased services.  
3. Providing Perverse Incentives For Increased Transparency 
The Database will provide both international and domestic pressure for 
governments to combat HTSE and publically record their efforts.  This 
pressure may create perverse incentives. Governments will have an 
incentive to look as though their HTSE prosecution and prevention efforts 
are successful in order to win political prestige, receive more foreign aid, or 
other benefits. With these valuable temptations, some governments may 
find distorting the data they submit to the Database to be cheaper and easier 
than actually combating HTSE. One of the main avenues they could use to 
achieve false successes in combating HTSE is to narrow the definition of 
trafficking or sexual slavery, in order to make it look like their country has 
less of a problem than it does. Alternatively, a legislature could expand 
definitions to include other common crimes to make it look as though they 
have increased prosecutions.  
Examining Canada’s definition of human trafficking illuminates this 
possibility. Recall that Canada’s definition of human trafficking is far 
narrower than the U.N. definition,193 with the result that many of incidents 
that the U.N. would qualify as human trafficking do not qualify as such in 
Canadian jurisdictions. For example, the Canadian definition of HTSE does 
not deal with those exploited through coercion, as it only addresses those 
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who use force or the threat of force.194 This analysis does not encompass 
the psychological hold that pimps often hold over those they exploit.195  
Another way records of HTSE prosecutions could be distorted is the 
existence of plea-bargaining in countries where prostitution is illegal. In 
countries where prostitution is not legal, there is the threat of plea-
bargaining corrupting the integrity of the data contributed to the Database. 
For example, if someone is charged with trafficking, that charge could be 
plea-bargained down to prostitution by the prosecutor. This bargaining 
would skew the reported data, which would create complications in 
forming successful strategies to combat HTSE. Countries that have 
legalized prostitution such as Germany and the Netherlands will not have 
this plea bargaining problem.196  
E. The Mediums for Destroying the Effectiveness of the Database 
1. Corruption 
Corruption exists everywhere but is particularly prevalent in 
developing countries, due to the high rates of poverty and 
unemployment.197 Developing countries are among the primary sources of 
HTSE.198 Corruption “at all levels, from the police officer to the judge” 
makes prosecuting traffickers difficult;199 often law enforcement will either 
be paid off to turn a blind eye toward certain HTSE incidents or else will 
release arrested traffickers will prematurely.200 The authorities “may use 
the prostitution services themselves or the criminals try to bargain with 
authorities and offer ‘compensation’ for their cooperation.”201 In fact, much 
HTSE activity could not function “without the complicity of law 
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enforcement and the corruption of officials in source, transit, and 
destination countries.”202 An infamous example of law enforcement 
complicity is the NATO-led military peacekeepers who trafficked Bosnian 
women in the aftermath of the violent breakup of Yugoslavia.203 While the 
peacekeepers were in the former Yugoslavia to aid in the transition at the 
end of the war, they also raped and trafficked women for their own 
benefit.204 The Database will unlikely have any significant impact on 
corruption and in fact corruption may frustrate the purposes of the 
Database by being an obstacle to the successful prosecution of traffickers 
and data collection on HTSE. 
2. Cultural Bias 
Another potential shortcoming of the Database is that it will also likely 
have very little effect on the cultural biases that perpetuate HTSE. Recall 
that the cultural “views of women as less valuable . . . have produced a 
more tolerant view of prostitution and sexual violence” against women in 
some areas of the world.205 Aside from the traditional prejudice against the 
victims of sexual exploitation,206 in some countries and cultures there are 
social pressures that facilitate the perpetuation of HTSE. The International 
Organization for Migration collected survey data that showed that “a 
client’s first experience with a prostitute was more likely to have been 
arranged by friends . . . than the result of an independent decision.”207 For 
the majority of men surveyed, “the initial decision to buy sex” was a 
“public and social matter.”208 Some of the men studied, particularly those 
from Thailand, discussed how “buying sex can be part of a ‘rite of 
passage,’ as well as a ritual to consolidate relationships with male 
friends.”209 Such cultural exercises perpetuate HTSE and will likely be 
unaffected by the institution of the Database.  
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Corruption and cultural bias could limit the Database’s effectiveness in 
some countries. But these obstacles are well known, and the benefits of the 
Database for most countries far outweigh the possible negative impact that 
these forces could have on others. The Database will be an effective tool to 
implement the true purpose of the Palermo Protocol: to unite the world in a 
common cause, the end of HTSE.     
CONCLUSION 
When the U.N. developed UNTOC and its supplementing protocols, it 
did not go far enough as inherent weaknesses within these treaties, likely a 
result of political posturing, created an international framework without an 
enforcement mechanism. As a consequence, HTSE still exists and 
flourishes.  
Though the creation of the Offenders of Humanity Database cannot 
end HTSE on its own, it can steer efforts in the right direction by providing 
an accessible tool for use by national and international law enforcement 
agencies. The Database can provide sentencing guidelines, a way to make 
the implementation of the Palermo Protocol transparent and available, and 
destroy the anonymity of those who profit from HTSE. The Database will 
also help prevent cultural attitudes from being an obstacle to the 
elimination of HTSE by making the issue more transparent. This process 
should add political pressure to keep politicians from breaking their 
promises- promises they made by signing these treaties.  
The world can come together again and finish what it started: 
diminishing HTSE to the extent that it only exists as a dark chapter in the 
history of the human race, instead of as an ever-present travesty. But for 
this to happen, the veil of secrecy under which human traffickers operate 
and flourish must be lifted. Once enemies are visible, they are far easier to 
defeat.  
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